Theoblogy Seminar |
|
|
An online place for some friends to get together and argue about what they care most about.
The "b" is silent. At the seminar table: Stephen Webb Trevor Bechtel Margaret Adam Phil Kenneson A. K. M. Adam Comments, queries, feedback to: A K M Adam |
Saturday, May 04, 2002
*
Another approach to hermeneutics observes that the wisest of biblical interpreters have persistently disagreed over legitimate interpretations. The lack of anything resembling a consensus in biblical interpretation (after millennia of spectacularly detailed study) raises the question of which of these scholars has arrived at the single legitimate interpretations.
*Thursday, April 11, 2002
Whoops! I'll get back to Matthew in a while, but first I owe Charlie Cosgrove an essay on hermeneutics. That one begins along the following lines:
*There are at least two leading questions in the study of hermeneutics and the ethics of interpretation. The first is the more familiar: How are we to understand texts? and its concomitant How shall we know whose interpretation is right (or “true” or “legitimate”)? This question has motivated most studies of hermeneutics, and a moment’s reflection reveals the reason such studies often evoke a fervor that far outweighs the extent of their contribution to a debate whose broad outlines have remained largely constant for decades. After all, once a scholar has figured out how to reach true understandings, the unwillingness of recalcitrant colleagues to adopt that true approach threatens the very structure of knowledge, the academy, even the Church’s teaching. Thus scholars have long sought the right answer to this urgent question. They have offered accounts of insight, understanding, empathy, intention, and various other features of legitimate hermeneutics. I will call this search for correct interpretation “integral hermeneutics,” as it poses for itself (and for the domain of all meaning, over which it usually claims dominion) the task of articulating the positive characteristics of unitary interpretive truth. Periodically, some critics pose a serious challenge to this enterprise. They argue, for instance, that “the author’s intention” is unsuitable as a criterion for assessing interpretations; perhaps it is unavailable, or insufficiently distinct. The practitioners of integral hermeneutics then develop an account of their field that accounts for and overcomes the critics’ objections, refining their account of their criteria, or defining those criteria more precisely, so as to reinstate a positive account of legitimate interpretation.
two ways: explaining/justifying unity of meaning, and explaining plurality
*summary of watson (T&T; T,C, & w) and Vanhoozer (ITAMITT?). Concern to defend truth, to adjudicate interpretations. Convention is ratified & refined by God. strength of integral: attn to unity of truth, uncontrolled by circumstance. Of differential: attn to differences in interpretation & allows for dissent w/o disrespect. In a certain respect, the two aren't antithetical. The unity of meaning (on a differential account) lies entirely beyond the present order- but don't deny some sort of unity. Similarly, integralists don't deny plurality nor do they wish by main force to impose their interpretive conclusions. Beginning of argument: our proposal does better at comprehending theirs than theirs does ours. Presumably F & K believe that the single meaning is found somewhere near the interpretations indigenous to Euro-America; does their ethic of interpretation entail eurocentric privilege? F & A can account for divergence w/o implicit hermeneutical imperialism. Emphatic implications for mission: unity of presence of Christ lies in church (with all its varying interps) not in TEXT. Does "local & contextual" entail a repudiation of more global truth claims? (Can a local claim make a claim to universality? Does that make the local claim invalid? Does it allow "local" universalities?) does an emphatic claim touniversality transcend its local origin? Can even professional interpreters discern with confidence what the single unified meaning might be? If not professionals, what about amateurs? Word of God -- are we ever in a position to make claims about the unity? If God makes divinity known to us through the economic trinity, and if the godhead is the locus of ineffable Truth, ought our interpretations not dwell in the domains of plurality & entrust the unity to God? Welker on plurality (bad) & pluralism (good) Difference between integral and differential often amounts to little more than consideration of scope of truth-claims; at other times, difference amounts to much more, especially when dispute concerns the status of those claims in a sense, differential is more catholic, since it points to the unity of god in its faith that "right" interpretation is comprehended among many varying proposals in god's charitable grace (is God's unity in doubt?). Integral is more protestant in its focus on "purity" or "correctness") which sometimes itself provokes schism (virtually necessarily when so much depends on getting Bible or doctrine orwhatever *right*).
The discussion with Steve Webb having settled down, I thought I'd try working on my boook about Matthew's Gospel on blogline. As David Weinberger says, "Let's just see how it goes."
*Chapter Two: Matthew and Judaism ¶ 2.1 In the first chapter, I asserted a number of times that Matthew is a faithful follower of the God of Israel; in contemporary language, he is a Jew. While this point seems painfully self-evident to me, wiser readers than I have questioned that premise. Indeed, some of the leading interpreters of Matthew's Gospel have supposed that Matthew was himself a Gentile. Since much of the rest of my picture of Matthew depends on my claim that Matthew operates squarely within the traditions of Judaism (as he construes them), this chapter will explain why, in the face of learned dissent, I imagine a Judaic Matthew. Thursday, February 28, 2002
I highlighted the "obviously" there because I took it to refer not to the claim that Matthew criticizes Judaism (that really would be obvious!) but to the claim that he does so within Judaism. That is, I thought you were saying that it is obvious to historians now that Matthew was working within Judaism, not against it, and that claim was not obvious to readers of the text a few generations ago, who probably saw Matthew as standing outside of Judaism--indeed, most conservative Christians probably still see Matthew as Standing outside of Judaism altogether. So I think there is historical progress in that most people today acknowledge that Matthew was writing with Judaism.
*Saturday, February 23, 2002
I had been forgetting that the model of interpretation Steve has been articulating should be recognized as culturally-specific, if not culturally-determined. The Orthodox churches have typically interpreted the Bible on a different basis altogether, following the practice of "reading Scripture through the Fathers." If someone wants to argue that Western (mostly Protestant) understandings of hermeneutics form an undebatable basis for legitimate biblical interpretation, she or he ought to give an account of the difference that premise makes for evaluating the practices of Orthodox theological interpretation.
*Thursday, February 21, 2002
Steve,
*Relative to the "obviously," I wasn't aware that anyone contrued Matthew's vituperative rhetoric as directed anywhere but against Judaism (as though, perhaps, the Pharisees were a pasteboard stand-in for his real adversaries, a faction of Antiochene idolaters or something). If that's not an "obvious" conclusion for any of my readers, they will of course doubt the rest of what I say. That's okay with me; I'm not trying to persuade everyone in the world, and I'm willing to start with people who think it's obvious that Matthew has a bone to pick with some of his Jewish colleagues. I don't think that that's a historical advance; it's just a generally-held picture of the way to read Matthew. I don't need it to be "an advance in our historical understanding." I'll stick with my claim of "impossibility" relative to reading back from an ancient text to its ideological interests," because I'm not acquainted with a way of ascertaining, especially from a bare text, what ideology drove its author. I appreciate your mention of the 1994 article, because one of my main points (having to do with Defoe's "Shortest-Way") argued exactly, from the reception of a text in its very own day, that Defoe's ideology wasn't immanent in the text; the ideology comes visible when we read "The Shortest-Way" in what we take to be its proper cultural setting, with a view toward Defoe's biography. How much more, when we have no significant biographical information about an author, when the "proper cultural setting" in question is usually derived hypothetically from the text that's being discussed, ought we to acknopwledge the tenuousness of our conclusions about texts' ideological entanglements. "A priori impossible"? I might back down from "a priori," but the force of evidence (just who agrees about the ideology of the Book of Daniel? How do I know whom I should rely on?) pushes me awfully close to the brink. Sorry, Steve, that technical difficulties contribute to our losing your voice in inter-academic conversation. Your responses have sometimes seemed harsh, but given your take on hermeneutics--that there is a meaning to texts, a meaning whose existence I wrong-headedly deny--I can see why you would be vexed by my resistance. One reason I adhere so fast to the take on hermeneutics from my side of the controversy is that my perspective enables me to explain why you and I might disagree, each of us thinking with strong justification that he is quite right, while enabling me to attribute our disagreement to more generous a basis than that one of us possesses superior insight or that the other is perverse, that one is sophisticated and the other ignorant. Keep in touch. Wednesday, February 20, 2002
Interesting that in AKMA's article on Matthew in SBL Seminar Papers (1994), he argues that texts don't have ideological meaning precisely because historians cannot determine that meaning, i.e., interpretation is solely due to communal standards and practices. And yet he says: "Matthew obviously excoriates various Judean parties, but he does so from within Judaism--not over against Judaism." This seems to me to be a historical argument that proves that advances can be made in our historical understanding of texts (note the obviously there--the text's history was not obvious to previous generations, but it is obvious to us today thanks to historical scholarship). I was also interested in Akma's quote of Fowl where Fowl says "it is often very difficult to read back from an ancient text to its ideological interests..." and AKMA adds, parenthetically, he might as well say it is never possible. I am comfortable with Fowl's comment, but not AKMA's, precisely because the parenthetical aside turns what is no doubt a very difficult task into an a priori impossible one, and thus moves out of hermeneutics and into metaphysics. By the way, I thought this essay was brilliantly argued, even though I didn't agree with some of it; I have really benefited from reading AKMA's work, and now I must sign off from Blooger for good because 1) it keeps eating my messages, so that I have to write them several times, and end up summarizing what I remember having said in short, condensed ways, probably distorting my own meaning and 2) I have been told that my remarks are repulsive and embarrassing, and I fear I have lost friends over my argumentative style, for which I sincerely apologize.
*Tuesday, February 19, 2002
Eno's comments are typical of the cultural elite, who think everything is a product of social construction. Indeed, social constructionism is the dogma of the academy, but I think there are signs that it too has had its day, and there is a renewed interest in realism. It flatters academics to think that the world is a product of their own making. |